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A Motivated Information-Processing Approach 
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Past research indicate that negotiators under outcome accountability, compared 
to non-accountable ones, are more prone to competitive behavior which leads to 
suboptimal agreements, even when there is the possibility of obtaining higher 
joint gain. However, recent research showed that negotiators under process 
accountability made more accurate estimates of the other party’s preferences and 
interests and obtained higher joint gain than the non-accountable counterparts. 
Moreover, there’s some evidence that equality in gain sharing may be moderated 
by social motives. The current study with professional negotiators (N = 88) focus 
on the effects of both outcome and process accountability on the negotiation 
processes in a prosocial climate. Results indicate that accountable negotiators 
tend to maximize the agreement’s value, thus suggesting a positive influence of 
the interaction of these two variables on the negotiation’s outcomes and pro-
cesses. Non-accountable negotiators and negotiators held accountable only for 
outcome tend to get lower gains than those obtained by the negotiators under 
process accountability, although they are prone to divide gains more equitably. 
Theoretical implications of these results as well as its consequences for the 
negotiation practice in organizations are discussed. 
KEY-WORDS: negotiation, accountability, social motivation, information processing
Negotiation is a critical activity for anyone who must interact with other people 
to accomplish interdependent goals concerning the allocation of scarce resources, 
work procedures, or the interpretation of specific facts in organizations (Pruitt, 1998). 
During the 20th century, the economic-rational models based on games theory 
restrained negotiation to a sequential process of interdependent decision making, 
which was conceived as if individuals acted in a fully rational manner. Such 
models are normative in nature, given that they indicate how individuals should 
1  Department of Human Resources and Organizational Behavior – Lisbon University Institute (ISCTE) 
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behave throughout the negotiation, as if they were purely rational agents. This 
view was challenged by bounded rationality theory (Simon, 1955) which inspired 
a more descriptive approach of negotiation focused on the actual behavior and 
cognitions of negotiators. In fact, observations of negotiators’ behavior show that 
they systematically violate the fundamental principles of the normative-rational 
theories. The descriptive approaches of negotiation indicate that even when 
they reach agreement, negotiators often arrive to inefficient outcomes, wasting 
opportunities for enlarging joint gain (Raiffa, 1982).
Most negotiations are mixed-motive situations, such that parties are motivated 
to cooperate with one another to reach agreement, but also to compete to claim 
resources (Walton & McKersie, 1965). In these situations, different patterns of 
priorities yield integrative potential, i.e., there’s a set of possible combinations 
of preferences and interests which allow obtaining optimized gains for both 
parties. Unfortunately, negotiators often don’t recognize these possibilities of 
maximizing joint gain and tend to reach suboptimal agreements. This difficulty 
has been attributed to the lack of accuracy of judgments about the other party’s 
priorities and interests. These inaccuracies prevent them from expanding the 
“pie” of available resources (e.g., Thompson & Hastie, 1990, Neale & Bazerman, 
1991). In fact, past research has pointed the negotiators’ tendency to base their 
judgments on inappropriate information and faulty beliefs as the main cause of 
unsuccessful negotiations. For instance, even when negotiators recognize the value 
of mutual agreement, frequently, they fall prey to a “fixed pie assumption”, that is, 
the biased perception that parties’ interests are completely opposed (Bazerman 
& Neale, 1986; Thompson & Hastie, 1990) and, in consequence, they fail to agree 
on a valuable solution for both parties.
Although these biases are robust and pervasive, some social context factors may 
have a de-biasing effect in negotiators’ cognition, leading them to recognize some 
compatible interests. So, a critical question is: what factors may have a de-biasing 
effect which, in turn, would allow negotiators to escape from the systematic 
cognitive biases that usually hinder performance? Some significant research on 
decision making suggests that accountability may be one of those factors. 
Accountability in negotiation
In human interdependent activities it is difficult to escape the evaluative scrutiny 
of others. Accountability is a permanent feature of organizational life, leading indi-
viduals to act in line with prevailing expectations from significant others and to 
anticipate justifications for deviant behaviors (Tetlock, 1998; 1999). In the broadest 
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sense, accountability occurs whenever the individual has an expectation, implicit 
or explicit, to be called upon to justify their actions, beliefs or feelings before 
others. However, in a finer approach, it appears that this is a multidimensional 
phenomenon and can be activated in different ways (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). For 
example, it occurs when someone has the expectation that her performance is 
being observed by others or simply when she expects to be evaluated by unknown 
or known others. The fact that individuals have the expectation of being person-
ally identified with their actions also constitutes a support to accountability.
As an almost ubiquitous context variable, accountability would seem to have an 
obvious relevance in organizational negotiation: for logistic reasons, in organiza-
tions, negotiators act on behalf of other people (supervisors, shareholders) and 
are accountable to them. However, cognitive paradigm, witch shaped most of 
negotiation research in the last decades (Bazerman et al., 2000), has relegated the 
study of accountability effects to a secondary plan. Ironically, the typical design 
of those studies about social cognition in negotiation is close to the framework 
of economic models based on games theory: “strangers who meet once, interact 
strategically and then they go their separate ways” (Kramer et al., 1993, p. 639). 
Accountability, being treated as an undesirable interfering variable in the experi-
mental plan, was annulled deliberately and overlooked in data analysis.
Diverging from this orientation, recent literature points to a more systematic 
attention to the effects of social context on cognitive processes in negotiation. 
However, interconnectedness of these contextual factors make difficult to 
understand their specific effects. Therefore, the inherent methodological diffi-
culties recommend researchers to focus on specific variables which occur more 
visibly and frequently in the social context of the negotiations. Accountability 
undoubtedly meets this condition: in organizational contexts, rarely negotiators 
act on behalf of their own interests. On the contrary, negotiations are embedded 
in social networks which evoke, explicitly or implicitly, the way significant others 
judge their results and actions. 
Past research indicate that negotiators who act on behalf of others, and must 
justify the agreements they obtain, tend to make fewer concessions, be more com-
petitive, and get sub-optimal agreements more often than the non-accountable 
ones (Rubin & Brown, 1975, Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). The tendency to exacerbate 
this competitive orientation appears to be directly proportional to the social 
pressure degree of the constituents (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt 1984b).
The most usual explanation of these results has been based on the effects 
that the representative role could exert on the behavior of negotiators (Enzle, 
Harvey, & Wright, 1992). For instance, Blake and Mouton (1961) suggested that 
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the implicit obligation imposed by the constituent and representative role on 
the one hand, the pressures associated to explicit social or financial rewards, 
on the other hand, will inevitably lead accountable negotiators to use inflexi-
ble and competitive negotiation strategies. As representative, the negotiator 
would assume an implicit contract to defend the interests of the constituency, 
and this assumption would be enough to evoke a strong win-lose orientation 
(Druckman, Solomon & Zechmeister, 1972), even in the absence of other exter-
nal pressures. The accountable negotiator would be much more competitive 
the higher the solidity of the link with a significant in-group (Breaugh & 
Klimoski, 1977), the lower the confidence of the constituents (Wall, 1975) and 
the lower the social status of the negotiator (Kogan, Lamm & Trommsdorff, 
1972). Another explanation is related to the negotiator’s perception that he 
or she is been evaluated. Because accountability makes individual identity 
salient, accountable negotiators would seek out strategies which allow them 
to save face through behaviors which are deemed appropriate to guarantee 
a positive judgment on the part of the constituents, even when those are 
unknown (Gruder, 1971). 
This approach seems to suggest an inevitable association between accountabi-
lity and competitiveness in negotiation, and it leaves little room for the way in 
which accountable individuals perceive their relationship with the constituents, 
as well as the nature of subsequent expectations about consequences of this 
relationship. On the other hand, in organizational adhocratic contexts (Mintzberg, 
1979), or in which there are weak hierarchical links and diminished power distance, 
accountability relationships tend to occur in a more fuzzy and less formal way 
than assumed in the literature, thus suggesting the need of a greater attention 
to how accountable individuals cognitively construct the situation.
Outcome and process accountability
Decision making approaches (e.g., Tetlock, 1999; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999) posit a 
major distinction in accountability condition: individuals may be held accounta-
ble for the outcomes of their decisions (what they’ve got) or/ and they may be 
under scrutiny for the process they use to make decisions (how they’ve decided). 
Research suggests that individuals under process accountability (individuals 
who believe they must justify the way they make decisions) are resistant to 
ordinary biases because they analyze the available information more carefully, 
and are more self-critical concerning the decision-making process. Research on 
negotiation also showed that process accountability contributes to enhance 
epistemic motivation (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) and individuals are more 
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likely to engage in systematic information processing. This enhanced cognitive 
effort and reduces some common biases on the negotiator judgment such as 
the fixed-pie perception (the inclination to believe that own and other’s interests 
and outcomes are diametrically opposed). As a result, accountable negotiators 
reach more integrative agreements than the non-accountable ones (De Dreu, 
Koole & Steinel, 2000; Simões, 2005). 
In organizational decision making, Simonson and Staw (1992) showed that out-
come accountability, compared with process accountability, enhances the decision 
maker’s propensity to engage in escalation of commitment. The authors argue that 
outcome accountability induces the need for self-justification causing a tendency 
to defend past lines of action. Instead, accountability process is associated with 
a greater propensity to weigh alternatives carefully, decreasing the importance 
of self-justification, once the expectation of evaluation by others is centered in 
decisions’ strategy choice to the detriment of the effectiveness of the decision 
in itself. Another line of distinction between the effects of process and outcome 
accountability is based on the differentiation of the motivational potential of 
each of these conditions. For example, Siegel-Jacobs and Yates (1996) argue that 
accountability process contains the tacit suggestion that the improvement of 
strategies will be positively reflected on performance. Therefore, it is a stronger 
incentive than outcome accountability which, despite the anticipation of reward, 
involves a high level of uncertainty.
Information processing and social motivation
Integrative negotiation is a cognitively demanding activity in terms of information 
analysis and problem-solving skills. To the extent that it fosters openness and 
information exchange, cooperation may facilitate integrative agreements. But, 
accordingly to dual concern model (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986) this can only happen 
when negotiators have a problem-solving orientation, which imply a combina-
tion of high concern for one’s own outcomes with a high concern for the other 
party’s outcomes. 
Negotiator’s cognitions seem to be influenced by social motivation directly. 
Individuals tend to seek, encode and retrieve information which is consistent 
with their social motivation. Specifically, negotiators tend to look for confirmatory 
information, consistent with their motivational orientation: prosocial individuals 
select information associated with equality, consensus and joint gain, whereas 
people with a selfish orientation are prone to confirm their egocentric beliefs, 
(e.g., De Dreu & Boles, 1998). 
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A study on the effects of accountability on negotiating performance
The association between accountability and the difficulty in obtaining integra-
tive agreements assumed by classical research does not appear to verify when 
accountability focuses on the process. On the other hand, the double concern 
model suggests that outcome accountability has opposite effects depending on 
the nature of social motivation of the negotiators. In fact, it interacts positively 
with prosocial orientation in achieving high joint gain, contrary to what happen 
with accountable negotiators who are oriented only to self-interest. In this view, 
the propensity to build integrative agreements in negotiators with prosocial 
motivation and held accountable for outcomes is interpreted as reflecting the 
interaction between the level of aspiration, induced by high accountability, and 
encouragement of a problem solving orientation promoted by the interests of 
the other party. So, resistance to yielding (associated with a high level of aspira-
tion) would be a crucial variable to explain the increase of joint gain when social 
motivation is high. However, the dual concern model does not mention anything 
about the consequences of this cognitive process. Despite the absence of direct 
empirical evidence, De Dreu and Carnevale (2003) suggested that high levels of 
aspiration may be associated with the strengthening of epistemic motivation. 
On the other hand, other studies (De Dreu et al., 2001; Simões, 2005) established 
that the positive influence of process accountability on joint gain is mediated 
by the increase of accuracy in information processing. This influence appears to 
be independent of the effects of social motivation. But the association between 
social motivation and process accountability moderately favors the discovery of 
integrative potential in the negotiations. Hence, we assume that the effect of 
outcome accountability may be similar to accountability process, but only when 
negotiators have a prosocial orientation. Since there is no specific research on 
this issue, to date, and as far as we know, it is possible to hypothesize that the 
effects of two types of accountability can be merged together, enlarging mutual 
gains as a result of an orientation that could be named “intelligent cooperation”2.
Past research has also shown that negotiators, who simultaneously display high 
social motivation and are under process accountability, have a propensity to 
divide the gains more evenly than accountable negotiators who have low social 
motivation (Simões, 2005). Those findings suggest that the same may happen with 
outcome accountability. On the other hand, when negotiators share a social identity, 
and are accountable for the outcomes of the other party, they tend to conclude 
egalitarian agreements (Kramer, Newton, &.Pommerenke, 1993). Assuming that 
the effects of the salience of common social identity and social motivation may 
be identical, we believe that the negotiators who are accountable for outcomes 
2  We owe to Carsten De Dreu (personal communication) the designation “clever cooperation” to identify 
this process.
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and urged by a third party to cooperate with the opponent may also engage in 
an equitable gains distribution.
The simultaneous influence of the two types of accountability may also have 
organizational relevance. The intricate web of interdependence in today’s organiza-
tions and increased concern about future interaction with the other party (today’s 
opponents may be tomorrow’s partners and vice-versa) lead more and more to 
situations in which negotiators attach high utility to a cooperative climate, whilst 
feeling strongly accountable not only for outcomes but also for the negotiation 
process. Additionally, volatility of organizational functions and roles generates in 
negotiator’s constituents a more explicit concern about the negotiation process 
(“how”) and not just about the outcomes (“what” or “how many”).
Method
Objective and hypotheses
This study aims to examine the specific effects of the interaction between process 
and outcome accountability on the negotiation performance when negotiators have 
a prosocial orientation. Considerations of the previous section lead us to formulate 
the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 1: When having high social motivation, nego-
tiators accountable for both process and outcome will get higher joint gain than 
negotiators held accountable for outcomes only; Hypothesis 2: When having high 
social motivation, negotiators held accountable for outcomes show more equal gain 
sharing than those who are simultaneously under process and outcome.
Experimental plan
To test these hypotheses we built a 2 factor (outcome accountability high vs. low) 
x 2 (process accountability: high vs. low) plan. Since we intended to examine the 
effects of two types of accountability in a prosocial climate, and in order to ensure 
the generalization of this condition, all participants were induced to cooperate with 
the other party during the interaction. To this end we used two procedures cumulati-
vely: participants were informed that they would work together on a task of mutual 
interest the next day (induction of expected future cooperation) and, at the same 
time, they were instructed to collaborate with the other party during negotiations. 
To check the effectiveness of the procedure, after negotiation participants answe-
red a short questionnaire consisting of four questions that seek to assess 1) the 
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extent to which participants believed in future cooperation with the other party 
and to what extent the negotiator had contributed 2) to help the other party 
reach her goals, 3) to attain a good performance during the negotiation, and 4) 
felt satisfied with the agreement. These last two indicators are similar to those 
used by emphasized instructions (e.g,, Giebels, De Dreu, & van de Vliert, 2003). 
The questions were answered using a seven-point scale (1 - strongly disagree to 
7 - strongly agree). These last four indicators were aggregated and averaged into 
a single index (α = .63).
Participants
Eighty-eight professionals3 (42% were women), from the service and industry 
sectors, and who were usually involved in negotiations, participated in the study. 
Forty-four dyads were formed and reached an agreement within the assigned time. 
Task and procedure
Each dyad negotiated face-to-face for up to 20 minutes, without any restric-
tion in the communication process, except for the interdiction of accessing the 
specific written information of the other party, with the aim of reaching an 
agreement on negotiating a setting of five items. This one is an adaptation of 
a task used in previous studies (O’Connor, 1997; Thompson, 1990) concerning 
a labor negotiation and involving two parties: a candidate (already selected) 
to a job and an employer’s representative4. Each item had five alternative 
proposals. Each alternative corresponds to a certain point value which deter-
mines the relative preferences of each party. Participants were informed that 
they should negotiate by using only the 25 alternatives (5 items x 5 alterna-
tives) included in the tables provided. Roles were randomly assigned and the 
3  Initially, the number of participants was 94. However, after performing the negotiation task, three dyads 
had displayed a value of social motivation significantly lower than the others. Since the pro-social envi-
ronment is treated as a general condition in this study, these three dyads were excluded from the sample.
4  The task involves organizational roles which may interfere with the understanding of the structure 
of negotiation items and priorities. So, we’ve taken an additional procedure in order to neutralize some 
possible effects of social role, particularly those that might arise from the perception of power asymme-
try. At this end, before reading the initial information about the task, as described, participants received 
the following information: “On the part of the company, the recruitment of this element is complete. In 
turn, the candidate is only interest in this company. So, the negotiation is intended solely to settle the 
conditions of their employment”. This information was reinforced in the written instructions.
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task was orally presented and explained in general terms. Then, participants 
received a set of written information, including the task description, the pay-
off tables corresponding to each role as well as information to manipulate 
the independent variables. All doubts were cleared within the limits of the 
experimental conditions. 
Independent variables
Process accountability 
Two levels of process accountability (high and low) were implemented by using 
standard experimental manipulation from the relevant literature. Participants 
were (not) informed that a group of experts would examine how they would lead 
negotiation, and would examine the procedures they followed, the decisions they 
made and the strategies they adopted.
Outcome Accountability 
This variable was manipulated (not) informing the participants that the quality of 
the agreement would be analyzed by a group of experts. Adopting a procedure used 
by De Dreu et al. (2000), the manipulation of both types of accountability has been 
strengthened by informing participants that they would be interviewed the next 
day by a negotiation expert called for that purpose. So they could take personal 
notes both during and after negotiation, in view of the “interview”. At that end, 
they were delivered a sheet of paper entitled “Notes for the interview,” including 
one or two fields, depending on the conditions: “Notes on my outcomes”and / or 
“Notes on my way of negotiating”
Dependent variables and measures
Judgment accuracy
Judgment accuracy (the first dependent variable) was measured by calculating, 
for each party, the difference between her estimate of the other party’s prefe-
rences and the other party’s actual preferences. At the end of the negotiation, 
participants were given a table similar to that indicated the same preferences 
that they used in negotiating, with the difference that this table did not indicate 
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the points assigned to each alternative. Then they were asked to complete this 
“empty” table, assigning the estimate of the number of points in the table of 
the opponent. They were also informed about the maximum and minimum 
values mentioned in both tables (400 and 0 points, respectively). Following the 
suggestions of Thompson and Hastie (1990), the measure of judgment accuracy 
took only into account the participant’s estimates of the two integrative items 
and the common value item. The measure was constructed by calculating, first, 
the sum of absolute differences between the estimates of each alternative and 
the actual values, and this sum was then divided by the maximum possible 
inaccuracy value, measured in points (2240), which allowed to obtain a measure 
of imprecision. Finally, that value was subtracted from the unit, allowing a more 
accurate indicator expressed as a value ranging from 0 (complete inaccuracy) 
and 1 (full accuracy).
Negotiation performance
Concerning the negotiation performance (the second dependent variable) two 
main measures were used: joint gain, i.e., the sum of points scored by each party 
in the final agreement; and gain distribution for each dyad, the ratio of the partial 
gains (highest value/ lowest value). The complete equality corresponds to 1, and, 
therefore, the less egalitarian the agreement the more the value of this indicator 
is departing from 1.
To allow detailed analysis of the results were still negotiating collected other 
measures of performance: level of aspiration, measured by value of the first offer, 
and resistance to yielding, measured by the difference between the values of the 
first offer and the individual value of agreement.
Results
Negotiation is an interdependent activity, implying that the results of each 
participant depend on the results of the other party and vice-versa. Therefore, in 
treatment of the data dyad was used as the unit of analysis. The measures used 
in this study meet a typical pattern of dyadic variables, that is to say, they vary 
within each dyad and between dyads (Kenney, 2001). Thus, following an established 
procedure in research on dyadic negotiations (e.g., Gelfand & Realo, 1999), we 
averaged the scores of both negotiators to create a dyad measure. Exceptions to 
this procedure are the measures that are dyadic, by definition, that is, the result 
of a specific relation (sum, difference) involving the individual values, as described 
in the preceding section.
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Manipulation check
Measured effects of the emphasized instructions and the induction of future coo-
peration in order to obtain a prosocial orientation in every cell of the experimental 
design are in line with the intended, as can be verified by the mean indicator of 
prosocial (minimum 1, maximum 7) in Table1. Post hoc tests (p <.05) indicate no 
significant differences between dyads of the four experimental cells.
Table 1. Means of social motivation indicator
Process 
Accountability
Outcome 
Accountability
M DP
High High 6.1 .49
High Low 5.9 .55
Low High 5.7 .47
Low Low 6.2 .53
The analysis of participants’ responses to manipulation checks questions indicate 
that it was positive for both independent variables. Process accountable partici-
pants displayed a belief of being scrutinized for the way they negotiate (M=4.2) 
significantly stronger (F (1,84) = 38.2, p <.01) than the non-accountable (M=2.04). 
Also, participants who were told that only the outcomes of the agreement would 
be scrutinized differ significantly (F (1,84) = 86.9, p <.001, M = 5.1) from those who 
did not receive this information (M = 1.89).
The role played in the negotiation task did not interfere in the agreement values 
(F (1,86) = 1.21, p <.24, ns) and the aspiration level (F (1,86) =. 23, p <.63, ns).
Hypothesis 1
The hypothesis that negotiators who were accountable for both process and 
outcome would obtain higher joint gain than those who had only been held 
accountable for outcomes received support. Univariate ANOVAs revealed significant 
effects of process accountability (F (1,42) = 47.7, p <.001) and outcome accountability 
(F (1,42) = 49.8, p <.03) on joint gain . Comparing the effects of both variables on 
joint gain through Tukey’s post hoc tests (p <.05) confirmed that the dyads who 
were accountable only for the process obtained higher joint gain (M = 1150) than 
(M = 968) the non-accountable negotiators (M = 916). The same applies to the 
difference between these two groups of dyads and those accountable for both 
process and outcome (M = 1326). There are no significant differences between 
the gains obtained by non accountable dyads and outcome accountability dyads.
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Table 2. Means of joint gain by condition
Process 
Accountability
Outcome 
Accountability
M SD
Low High 968 80.5
Low Low 916 83.6
High High 1326 157.1
High Low 1150 148.4
The analysis of joint gain revealed an interaction effect between the two indepen-
dent variables (F (1, 40) = 5.37; p <.03), indicating that negotiators held accountable 
for the process maximize joint gain when they are simultaneously accountable for 
outcome. This result seems to support our main hypothesis. However, taking into 
account that negotiators who were only held accountable for outcome obtained 
join gains which were similar to those obtained by non-accountable dyads and 
lower than process accountable negotiators, this interaction effect suggest that 
these two types accountability have different influences on joint gain. Apparently, 
outcome accountability has only significant influence on the achievement of joint 
gain when coupled with process accountability.
Accuracy of judgment
The accuracy of judgment does not seem to be influenced by outcome accoun-
tability, F (1,42) =. 29, p <.59, ns. Rather, confirming the results of previous studies 
(e.g., Simões, 2005), we found a significant effect of process accountability F (1, 
42) = 28.08, p <.001), indicating that accountable negotiators made more accurate 
judgments of the other party’s preferences (M =. 64) than the non-accountable 
counterparts (M =. 39). Since those previous results highlighted the mediating role 
of the accuracy in judging of the other party’s preferences on the achievement 
of joint gain, we also analyzed this possibility in the present study, following the 
steps prescribed by Baron and Kenney (1986). The first regression showed that the 
accountability process is correlated with joint gain (β =. 62, p <.01) and, separately, 
with the accuracy (β =. 54, p <.01). The integration of independent variables and 
the hypothetical mediator in the equation led to the breakdown of significance 
of the effect of accountability (β =. 14, p =. 30, ns), confirming that accuracy of the 
judgments about the preferences of the other party mediates the achievement of 
joint gain in negotiations in which individuals are under process accountability. 
The mediation test on outcome accountability has been discarded because there 
is no significant correlation between this independent variable and judgment 
accuracy, the hypothesized mediator.
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Hypothesis 2 
Descriptive statistics points to a general tendency to equitable outcomes in all cells 
of the experimental design, regardless of the joint gain level. However, analysis 
show a main effect of outcome accountability on gain distribution indicator, F 
(1,42) = 4.09, p <.03. In line with our prediction, the dyads in this condition have 
divided gains more e equitably (M = 1.04, SD =. 6) than those who did not feel 
accountable (M = 1.26, SD =.5). A similar analysis on process accountability has 
not proved significant (F (1,42) = 09.01, p =. 43, ns), and the same is true regarding 
the an interaction effect between these two variables, F (1,40) = 2.08, p =. 15, ns.
Discussion
First of all, results confirm that process accountability enhances the discovery of 
integrative agreements via an increase in accuracy in estimating the preferences 
of the other party. This effect is associated with higher joint gain as noted in 
previous studies (De Dreu et al, 2000; Simões, 2005). Secondly, when having a 
high social motivation, participants simultaneously held accountable for process 
and outcome obtained higher joint gain, suggesting the existence of a positive 
interaction between the two variables in creating value in negotiation.
Concerning gain distribution, results indicate that non-accountable dyads tend 
to be more egalitarian, although they present lower joint gains, which is in 
line with what was observed in past research. The most salient finding, in our 
view, refers to the fact that the association of prosocial climate and outcome 
accountability can also lead to a tendency toward equal division of the gain, but 
departing from a lower level of joint gains comparing to the negotiators who 
are also under process accountability. On the other hand, the most intriguing 
result, and not anticipated in our hypotheses, refers to the low value of the joint 
gain achieved by dyads solely accountable for the outcomes, which apparently 
contradicts classic research which predicts high joint gain in this condition when 
social motivation is high. However, in those studies, outcome accountability was 
manipulated through instructions that emphasized the representative role and, 
on the other hand, evoked explicit normative control of outcomes on the part 
of the constituents. In a seminal study in this field (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984a), 
highly accountable participants acted on behalf of a company and the points 
they obtained in the agreement were transformed into real money which would 
be divided between participants and the company, according to the evaluative 
judgment of the company’s owner. In the high accountability condition, participants 
were told that the criteria for evaluating the effectiveness depended exclusively 
on the owner’s view and that he would write a brief assessment of their effec-
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tiveness in negotiation. The effects of the combination of social motivation and 
accountability were, in this study, primarily explained as “creative impact” in the 
negotiators’ reaction to the conflict between the needs of their constituents and 
responding to the needs of the opposing side “(Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984a, p. 293). 
Differently, in our study, accountability refers to unknown constituents and does 
not evoke norms involving explicit and direct consequences for negotiators. So, 
the divergence of results concerning joint gain may correspond to a difference 
in the nature of accountability pressures. In fact, according to the model of social 
contingency (Tetlock, 1999), accountability to constituents whose orientations 
are unknown tend to activate preventive self-criticism and stimulates epistemic 
motivation. Conversely, when the constituents’ views are known, there is the ten-
dency of individuals to adopt positions and choices which they believe that are in 
accordance to the expectations of the constituents. Thus, in the same way as the 
competitive orientation of accountable negotiators (indicated by classic research) 
may result from the assumption that constituents expect from them a “hard” 
negotiation behavior, participants of our study, who were held accountable for 
outcomes, might have assumed that the expectation of unknown constituents 
pointed to the equal division of resources. We suspect that the instructions of 
collaboration with the other party might have been retrospectively interpreted 
as tacit expectations of equality. Participants will have possibly focused on the 
outcome, as gain equilibrium, than on quality of the agreement as a whole. The 
fact that this egalitarian tendency has proved to be much less significant, and in 
tandem with the achievement of higher joint gain, in dyads accountable for the 
way they’ve negotiated seems to indicate that focusing in the process of nego-
tiating, rather than on outcomes, serves to maximize the benefits of a prosocial 
climate in negotiation.
Limitations of study
The participation of professional negotiators in experimental studies can be seen 
as an essential desideratum to increase the ecological validity of results which is 
not negligible in a field with high importance is the organizational and negotiation. 
However, the risk of possible interference of factors not subject to experimental 
control, such as personal beliefs and “mental models” prevailing in the organiza-
tions of origin, advises caution in generalizing these results. However, it should 
be noted that the clearest results are consistent with those obtained in previous 
studies with students, namely the confirmation that the process accountability 
positively influences the accuracy in information processing, which, in turn, is 
conducive to achieving higher joint gain.
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Conclusions and practical implications
This study confirms that process accountability affects how negotiators process 
information, leading them to analyze it more accurately. Process accountability 
is a factor in the social context of negotiations of that influences the epistemic 
motivation, similarly to what literature on individual decision-making has suggested.
As in previous studies (e.g., Simões, 2005) we found no significant indications 
that the level of resistance to yielding is associated with epistemic motivation, 
unlike the prediction of the double concern model. Since the measure of resis-
tance to yielding referred to a level of aspiration spontaneously displayed by the 
participants, future research, in which resistance to yielding being manipulated 
by (not) establishing high levels of aspiration (e.g., Ben-Yoav & Pruitt 1984b), may 
shed new light on of this issue. Outcome accountability has not the same effect 
when negotiators interact in a prosocial climate. It may constitute an ambiguous 
construct referring to a situation which essence may change contingently with the 
negotiators’ perception about what they believe to be the specific expectations 
of the constituents, and so this is an issue that requires further investigation.
Apparently, when held accountable for both outcome and process, negotiators 
with high social motivation tend to coordinate satisfaction of self-interest with 
maximizing joint gain, taking into account the interests of the opponent. And 
they get it while considering information on the structure of the items and the 
preferences of both parties. Put it another way, the prosocial orientation seems to 
favor the maximization of joint gain but only when epistemic motivation is high. 
Prescribing some generic relational skills development to foster cooperation between 
negotiators, as is currently frequent in training, may be insufficient to ensure the 
preparation of professional negotiators to enhance the quality of agreements. 
Whilst the skills to promote a positive interpersonal relationship may be a factor 
for facilitating the exchange of information, further analysis of this, particularly in 
structurally complex negotiations, depends on a set of contextual factors. Among 
these, some may be deliberately changed. Our results suggest that accountability 
for the way they negotiate lead practitioners to consider the scope a greater number 
of alternatives by deepening the processing of information available, either in situ 
or by using data processing systems to support decision making. 
Contrary to outcome accountability which refers almost exclusively to the sphere 
of relationships between management and negotiator, and focus on the control 
of objectives, it is our understanding that process accountability fall within the 
broader context of organizational cultural values and standards. For example, in 
an environment that promotes organizational learning, i.e., where knowledge 
sharing is valued regularly and collectively, it should be normal for individuals 
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to be under high accountability not only for what they get but also for the ways 
they succeed. However, as mentioned above, the construction of accountability 
links is contingent on how individuals perceive the relationship with the consti-
tuents. Hence, in the current state of research, it would be unwise to set a strict 
organizational policy that does not take into account the characteristics of the 
specific micro-context. But, as a general rule, accountability seems to strongly foster 
negotiation outcomes and processes, especially in a cooperative environment.
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Responsabilização por Processo e por Resultado na Negociação:  
uma Abordagem de Processamento Motivado da Informação
Pesquisas anteriores indicam que os negociadores responsabilizados por resul-
tados, em comparação com os não responsabilizados, são mais propensos a um 
comportamento competitivo, o que conduz a acordos sub-óptimos mesmo quando 
existe a possibilidade de obtenção de maior ganho conjunto. Contudo, pesquisas 
recentes mostraram que os negociadores sob responsabilização de processo fazem 
estimativas mais precisas das preferências e dos interesses da outra parte e obtêm 
ganhos conjuntos mais elevados do que os não responsabilizados. Além disso, 
existem algumas evidências de que a igualdade na partilha de ganhos pode ser 
moderada por motivos sociais. O presente estudo com negociadores profissionais 
(N = 88) incide nos efeitos simultâneos da responsabilização por processo e por 
resultado sobre os processos de negociação num clima pró-social. Os resultados 
indicam que os negociadores responsabilizados simultaneamente por processo 
e por resultado tendem a maximizar o valor do acordo, sugerindo uma influência 
positiva da interacção destas duas variáveis sobre a qualidade dos acordos. Os 
negociadores não responsabilizados e os que estão responsabilizados apenas pelo 
resultado tendem a obter ganhos conjuntos mais fracos do que os obtidos pelos 
negociadores sob responsabilização pelo processo, embora dividam os ganhos de 
forma mais igualitária. São discutidas as implicações teóricas destes resultados bem 
como as consequências para as práticas de negociação nas organizações.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: negociação, responsabilização, motivação social, processamento 
de informação
